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DIVERSITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: GRANT
V. SWT, THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, AND THE
FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
HEATHER HUNT*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the huge diversity of peoples who make up the human race, there are
a number of universal constants which have always been part of the
human condition. One is that people who are different inspire fear
which often leads to prejudice; another is that a proportion of the hu-
man race is homosexual.]
This reality has lead to another phenomenon best summed up by
George Orwell: "All animals are equal, but some animals are more
equal than others."2 This short and straight-forward characterization
best describes the situation facing the lesbian and gay community with
respect to a number of issues within the European Union ("EU"). One
such issue is the free movement of persons. The EU has confronted this
issue because of the recent focus on European economic unity and the
rise of the gay rights movement during the last several years. This is-
sue has an impact on economic unity because discrimination in the
workplace that significantly affects one sector of the population (i.e. the
homosexual population), directly inhibits the formation of the economic
community the EU is attempting to build.
In the European Union, the European Social Charter promises that
"[e]veryone shall have the opportunity to earn his living in an occupa-
tion fully entered upon."3 Unfortunately, this promise does not univer-
sally apply. Theoretically, Community Law guarantees to all EU citi-
zens the right to enter and to seek or take up work in any Member
*Juris Doctor, University of Denver, May 1999.
1. Peter Ashman, Introduction, in HOMOSEXUALITY: A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
ISSUE: ESSAYS ON LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 3 (Kees
Waaldijk & Andrew Clapham, eds., 1993).
2. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946).
3. James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 112 (1994).
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State. 4 This right, however, is limited by the ability of national authori-
ties to impose restrictions on the right to work in their countries. EU
Member States may base these restrictions on public policy, public se-
curity, and public health concerns. 5 These limitations, however, must
apply equally to the nationals of the Member State, as they apply to
citizens of other Member States.6 Thus, in the sexual preference con-
text, when a Member State discriminates against its own nationals,
based on their sexual orientation, so long as the discrimination applies
to nationals of other Member States the same as it applies to nationals
of that Member State, Community law allows such discrimination.
Most Member States, while not per se discriminating against homo-
sexuals, do not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. In
fact, at the time of publication, only France, Ireland, and the Nether-
lands have laws that give legal protection against employment dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. 7 Consequently, only French,
Irish and Dutch nationals, and nationals of other Member States
working in France, Ireland or the Netherlands have formal protection
against employment discrimination.
In the EU, a case before the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")
brought the issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation to in-
4. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
58, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]; see Andrew Clapham & J.H.H. Weiler,
Lesbians and Gay Men in the European Community Legal Order, in HOMOSEXUALITY, su-
pra note 1, at 39.
5. Clapham & Weiler, supra note 4, at 39. There are restrictions on what Member
States can claim as public policy, and public policy justifications are subject to review by
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Id. However, when the interests involved are those
of homosexuals, many justifications are allowed for limitations set by governments (i.e.
denial of access to gay partners as against public policy; interference with free movement
of gay workers on grounds of public health; barring homoerotic goods based on public mo-
rality). Id. at 20.
6. Article 6 of the EEC Treaty prohibits discrimination based on nationality, and
Article 8a provides that every EU citizen has the right to move and reside within the ter-
ritory of other Member States. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, arts. 6 and 8.
7. Wilets, supra note 3, at 114. Article 416(3) of the French Penal Code and Article
L. 122-145 of the French Code of Labor Law prohibits discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation. Article 5 of the General Treatment Law of the Netherlands prohibits employers
from making "direct or indirect distinctions based on heterosexual or homosexual orienta-
tion or civil status." Article 6 prohibits such distinctions in self-employment. Id. (inter-
nal quote and citation omitted). James D. Wilets, The Human Rights of Sexual Minori-
ties: A Comparative and International Law Perspective, 22 Fall Hum. Rts. 22, 25 (1995).
Denmark prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, but does not limit the pro-
hibition to employment. In Ireland, according to the 'Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred
Act 1989', it is a crime to incite to hatred on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. The mili-
tary is one area where a number of EU members do not discriminate. Wilets, supra note
3, at 115. The following countries allow homosexuals to serve in their armed forces: Italy,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway and Spain.
Id. However, Belgium, Finland, France and Germany place restrictions on homosexual
citizens in the military. Id.
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ternational attention. 8 In Grant v. South West Trains, Ltd. ("Grant v.
SWT'), the ECJ addressed the issue of a corporation's obligation to pro-
vide same-sex partners of employees the same benefits as those offered
to heterosexual partners of employees. 9 The Court held that:
[t]he refusal by an employer to allow travel concessions to the person of
the same-sex with whom a worker has a stable relationship, where
such concessions are allowed to a worker's spouse or to the person of
the opposite sex with whom a worker has a stable relationship outside
marriage, does not constitute discrimination prohibited by Article 119
of the EC Treaty or Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the
8. See Case C-249/96 Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) 193
[hereinafter Grant]. As of January 1995, the EU is comprised of fifteen (15) Member
States: France, Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Fin-
land, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Norway. BARRY E. CARTER
& PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, STATES AND OTHER MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES: TREATY OF
ROME OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, INTERNATIONAL LAw: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 209 (1995).
The EU consists of a number of institutions whose functions range from legislative and
administrative to judicial: The European Parliament, which is directly elected by univer-
sal suffrage, represents the people of the EU. What is the European Community? (visited
June 6, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/preslqce.htm>. The European Parliament en-
gages in lawmaking and budget setting, but has limited control over EU affairs. Id. The
Parliament also has supervisory powers over the EU Commission. Laurence R. Heifer,
Lesbian and Gay Rights as Human Rights: Strategies for a United Europe, 32 Va. J. Int'l
L. 157, 184 (1991). The European Council, as the executive body of the EU, takes the de-
cisions of the European Parliament and adopts Community Legislation. Id. The Council
is composed of representatives from the fifteen Member States, and its membership de-
pends upon the subject under consideration (i.e. it may be made up of 15 Ministers of For-
eign Affairs, Transport, Finance, et cetera). What is the European Community? (visited
June 6, 1999) <http://europa.eu.inttcj/en/pres/qce.htm>. The European Commission, com-
posed of 20 independent members, proposes Community legislation for consideration by
the EU Council, monitors compliance with the legislation and administers common poli-
cies. Id. See Helfer, supra, at 184. At the center of the EU's judicial arm is the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ). What is the European Community?: A Court for Europe (vis-
ited June 6, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/pres/jeu.htm>. The ECJ is housed in
Luxembourg, and the main function of the ECJ is to ensure that the EU Member States
observe Community Law uniformly. Id. When making its decisions, the ECJ relies on
"Community Law," which is Community legislation that applies to all fifteen Member
States. Id. EU Community Law, independent and uniform in all Member States, is supe-
rior to the national laws of Member States. Id. Unlike other similar institutions (i.e. the
International Court of Justice), the ECJ has jurisdiction over disputes involving not only
Member States and Community Institutions, but also individuals. Id. The ECJ has fif-
teen judges and nine advocate generals. What is the European Community?: Composition
and Organization (visited June 6, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/pres/co.htm>. EU
Member States appoint the judges and advocate generals by common accord. Once ap-
pointed, judges and advocate generals serve renewable six-year terms. Id. The advocate
generals play a key role in the adjudication of ECJ cases. Prior to the Court rendering its
decisions, an Advocate General delivers an opinion as to how the Court should rule on the
case before it. Id. The opinions of advocate generals are impartial and independent of
the opinions of the Court. Id.
9. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 1.
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
application of the principle of equal pay for men and women.' 0
Due to the broad scope of ECJ decision-making power, this decision
has more far-reaching implications than does a decision by a national
court of an EU Member State. 11 One of the concerns raised by this de-
cision is the possibility that allowing corporations within EU Member
States to make discriminatory policies based on an employee's sexual
orientation could infringe on that employee's right of free movement.'2
For example, if a national of one Member State that does not discrimi-
nate against homosexuals receives a job offer in another Member State,
only to discover later that the foreign Member State allows corporations
to discriminate against homosexuals, the national would be inhibited
from moving to the foreign Member State, thereby defeating one main
purpose of economic unity. Additionally, a significant problem arises in
the EU because the right of free movement of persons is fundamental to
the European Union and its underlying purposes. 13 As a result, for the
past several years, the European Parliament has made numerous at-
tempts to discourage the type of discrimination sanctioned by South
West Trains.
In June 1997, in an attempt to inter alia avoid future problems in
the area of discrimination based on sexual orientation, the European
Council passed the Treaty of Amsterdam ("Amsterdam Treaty"). The
Amsterdam Treaty amended the Treaty on European Union, the trea-
ties establishing the European Communities and Certain Related
Acts. 14 The Amsterdam Treaty prohibits, among other things, discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation. 15 In light of this new treaty, the
Grant v. SWT decision may not have the far reaching consequences first
anticipated. However, as discussed more fully below, there are still a
10. Id. at 1 51.
11. Decisions of the ECJ affect all EU Member States and are binding on such Mem-
ber States with respect to Community Law. What is the European Community? (visited
June 6, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/pres/qce.htm>.
12. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, arts. 3 and 48. In the EU context, free movement of
persons means that each Member State must abolish nationality discrimination, between
workers of Member States with regard to employment, remuneration and other work and
employment conditions. Id. art. 48. This right also means that EU citizens can accept
offers of employment; move within the Member States in order to accept employment;
stay within a Member State for the purpose of employment; and remain in the territory of
a Member State after having been employed in the State. Id. This article does not apply
to public service employment. Id. Prohibitions on employment discrimination have ex-
tended to sex as well as nationality. Id. art. 119.
13. See id. arts. 3 and 48.
14. See EUROPEAN UNION: CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION AND CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Oct. 2, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 56 [hereinafter Amsterdam Treaty]. The Amsterdam
Treaty amended the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts. Id.
15. Id. at pt. 1, art. 13.
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number of hurdles the gay and lesbian community must overcome be-
fore the prohibition on discrimination based on sexual orientation be-
comes a reality.
This paper addresses and focuses on the impact the Amsterdam
Treaty will have on EU Member States, concentrating particularly on
the provisions relating to discrimination based on sexual orientation,
and its affect on the free movement of persons. This paper also ana-
lyzes how the Amsterdam Treaty affects the Grant v. SWT decision be-
cause Grant v. SWT will continue as the controlling Community Law
until the European Council - utilizing the provisions of the Amsterdam
Treaty - changes the law relating to discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation.
Part II of this paper discusses the various laws of EU Member
States regarding same-sex partnerships. Part III analyzes the Grant v.
SWT opinion and its impact on European Community Law. Part IV of
this paper examines the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and the
potential affect this Treaty will have on discrimination based on sexual
orientation and the free movement of people.
II. MEMBER STATE LAWS REGARDING RECOGNITION OF SAME SEX
RELATIONSHIPS
Attempts at fighting discrimination based on sexual orientation
gained momentum as early as the late 1800's in Germany, and the early
1900's in England and America. 16 Unfortunately, the movement in
Europe has only recently, as late as 1989, made definitive strides to-
ward recognizing same-sex relationships and prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Consequently, due to the different social,
political and economic views of the various EU countries, the laws of
EU countries regarding recognition of same-sex relationships vary
widely. For example, a number of Member States recognize same-sex
partnerships and afford people in those relationships many of the same
rights afforded heterosexual couples. 17 While some Member States rec-
16. Robert P. Cabaj, History of Gay Acceptance and Relationships in ON THE ROAD TO
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A SUPPORTIVE GUIDE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES 11 (Robert P. Cabaj & David W. Purcell eds., 1998).
17. Analysis: Gay Rights: Coming Out of the Shadows, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 9, 1997,
at 17. Deborah M. Henson, A Comparative Analysis of Same-Sex Partnership Protections,
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER 42-43 (Andrew Sullivan, ed., 1997).
One of the significant rights denied same-sex couples is the right to adopt children. Id. at
43. See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text. The laws in some EU countries are
more progressive than in other nations of the world, most notably the United States,
where, in 1996 Congress and President Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act, which
defines marriage as the "union between a man and a woman," and allows states to pass
laws refusing to recognize same-sex marriage. David W. Purcell, Current Trends in
1999
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ognize same-sex marriages, others do not recognize same-sex partner-
ships at all, let alone marriages. 18 In the future, however, individual
Member States' recognition of same-sex relationships may be irrelevant
in light of the passage of the Amsterdam Treaty. 19 Nevertheless, until
that time, the laws of the Member States in which they live confine ho-
mosexual citizens in the EU, and their rights.
The following is a representation, by country, of the various provi-
sions relating to same-sex relationships.
Denmark: Denmark was the first country to legally recognize same-
sex partnerships. 20 On October 1, 1989, the Danish Parliament passed
a law allowing "registered partnership for two persons of the same-
sex."2' 1 Public registration allows registered same-sex couples to enjoy
the same legal rights enjoyed by married couples, 22 with the exception
of adopting children, in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, and
church weddings. 23 On limitation is that at least one of the registrants
must be a Danish citizen and live in Denmark.24 In 1997, the State Lu-
theran Church approved same-sex marriage in the church, but the
ceremony must be different from heterosexual marriage. 25
Norway: In 1993, Norway passed partnership legislation modeled
on the Danish example. 26 The Norwegian legislation offers same-sex
couples national insurance benefits, pensions, inheritance rights, and
mandates that same-sex couples must be mutually responsible to sup-
port each other financially. 27
Sweden: Sweden decriminalized homosexuality in 1994.28 On
January 1, 1995, the Swedish Registered Partnership Law became ef-
fective. 29 This law granted same-sex couples virtually the same rights
afforded to heterosexual married couples.30 However, as other Regis-
tered Partnership Acts, this law denies same-sex couples access to
adoption, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and church wed-
Same-Sex Marriage, in ON THE ROAD, supra note 16, at 34.
18. No Bias In Same-Sex Ban on Travel Perk, TIMES (London), Feb. 23, 1998, at 41.
19. Id. See Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt. 1, art. 13.
20. Leslie Goransson, International Trends in Same-Sex Marriage, in ON THE ROAD,
supra note 16, at 167.
21. Id. at 171.
22. Id. at 170. Those rights include inheritance, insurance benefits, employment
benefits, financial support obligations, and so on. Id. at 174.
23. Id. at 171.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 173.
26. Goransson, supra note 20, at 173.
27. Id. at 174.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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dings.31 Sweden also has a domestic partner law for those couples who
choose not to register. 32 The domestic partner law provides many of the
same rights as the Registered Partner Act, but a domestic partner does
not automatically inherit a deceased partner's assets, whereas a regis-
tered partner does.33
European Union: In 1994, the European Parliament passed a
resolution calling for Member States to pass legislation giving homo-
sexual couples access to marriage, or a similar institution. 34 The reso-
lution also encouraged Member States to allow homosexual partners to
adopt and/or foster children. 35
France: In France, the civil status of homosexuals will come closer
to married status under the proposed Civil Solidarity Pact law. 36 This
law allows unmarried couples to sign civil solidarity pacts at police sta-
tions thereby giving homosexuals rights they do not currently enjoy.37
Spain: Several cities have passed a "register of civil actions."38 On
a local level, these registers give unmarried couples rights commensu-
rate with those enjoyed by married couples. However, these registers
do not afford rights to homosexual couples on a regional or national
level. 39 In June 1997, the Parliament of the region of Catalonia voted to
allow partnerships between homosexuals, giving them rights identical
to those given married couples, except adoption. 40
Italy: The cities of Pisa and Florence allow homosexuals to record
their partnerships. 41 Country-wide legislation has not been passed.42
United Kingdom ("UK"): The UK is one of the most hostile EU na-
tions with respect to recognizing homosexual relationships. For exam-
ple, the UK still makes a distinction between the age of consent for het-
erosexual relationships (age 16), and homosexual relationships (age
18).43 However, the UK has made strides. For instance, homosexual
31. Id.
32. Goransson, supra note 20, at 174.
33. Id. at 176.
34. Id.
35. Id. Finland has been working on Registered Partner legislation, but as of October
1998, it still had not passed such legislation. From Marriage Rights to Murder: How the
World Treats Gays, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Oct. 7, 1998, in 1998 WL 16614115.
36. From Marriage to Murder, supra note 35.
37. Id. See Ray Moseley, French Debating Legal Status of Unwed Couples: Coalition
Opposes Government-Backed Bill to Extend Rights, Labeling it as Way to Legalize Vice,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1999, at 5.
38. Goransson, supra note 20, at 184.
39. Id. at 183-84.
40. From Marriage Rights to Murder, supra note 35.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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relationships were decriminalized in 1967. 44 In 1996, a homosexual was
allowed to adopt a child. 45
Ireland: In 1993, homosexuality was decriminalized for people sev-
enteen and older. 46 Ireland and the UK do not have any laws giving
homosexual cohabiting couples rights commensurate with those offered
married couples (i.e. inheritance, insurance benefits, employment bene-
fits, financial support obligations, and so on).
The above serves merely as an overview of the differences the
European Parliament, Council and Commission face in attempting to
pass legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Difficulties in passing legislation will continue to exist regardless of the
theoretical ability to pass community-wide legislation as provided for in
the Amsterdam Treaty.
III. GRANT V. SWT
This section addresses the Grant v. SWT decision, and its impact on
the EU as a whole. One main function of the ECJ is to give preliminary
rulings on the interpretation of treaties and other secondary legislation
of the EU. 4 7 EU Member States, when unsure of the interpretation of
Community Law, may present a case to the ECJ and request a prelimi-
nary ruling on the matter.48 When the ECJ renders a ruling, the Mem-
ber State requesting such ruling must enforce the ECJ decision without
modification. 49 Preliminary rulings may serve as guides for all Member
States faced with the same or similar issues.5° This further ensures
uniformity in the interpretation of Community Law. Once the ECJ
renders a decision, EU citizens, as well as Member States, may seek to
have their national laws officially superseded if they contradict Com-
munity Law. 51 In Grant v. SWT, the Industrial Tribunal South Hamp-
ton referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.52
In 1995, Lisa Grant petitioned her employer, South-West Trains
Ltd. ("SWT") for travel benefits for her lesbian partner Jillian Pacey. 53
44. Id.
45. From Marriage Rights to Murder, supra note 35.
46. Id.
47. What is the European Community?: Jurisdiction (visited June 6, 1999)
<http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/pres/comp.htm>o
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. What is the European Community?: The Court of Justice and European Integra-
tion (visited June 6, 1999) <http:/leuropa.eu.inttcj/en/pres/cieu.htm>.
52. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 11.
53. Id. at 7.
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SWT provides travel benefits to "one common law opposite sex spouse of
staff.., subject to a statutory declaration being made that a meaning-
ful relationship has existed for a period of two years or more."54 SWT
extended this provision to include opposite sex cohabiting partners of
employees. 55 At the time of her request, Ms. Grant had lived with Ms.
Pacey for over two years.5 6 SWT denied Ms. Grant's request, asserting
that based on SWT's policies, benefits for unmarried couples are only
given to opposite sex partners.5 7 Ms. Grant then went to the Industrial
Tribunal South Hampton, asserting that SWT's action constituted dis-
crimination based on sex, contrary to the Equal Pay Act of 1970, Article
119 of the EC Treaty and/or Directive 76/207/EEC.58 Ms. Grant's claim
was supported by the fact that one of her colleagues had obtained travel
benefits for his live-in girlfriend.59 The Tribunal then referred the case
to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling regarding discrimination based on
sexual orientation and its relation to Article 119 of the EC Treaty
and/or Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975.60
Prior to the ECJ rendering its decision in this case, the Advocate
General issued an opinion. The Advocate General's opinion suggested
to the Court that it should decide in favor of Ms. Grant because SWT's
policy regarding travel concessions for same-sex couples violates Article
119 of the EC Treaty. 61 The Advocate General's opinion analyzed the
54. Id. at 5 (emphasis added) (quotes omitted).
55. Id. at 1 8.
56. Paul L. Spackman, Note and Comment, Grant v. South-West Trans: Equality for
Same-Sex Partnerships in the European Community, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y, 1063,
1102 (1997).
57. No Bias in Same-Sex Ban on Travel Perk, supra note 18, at 41.
58. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 9. Ms. Grant relied on these provisions because
Article 119 provides that "[elach Member State shall during the first stage ensure and
subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and women should re-
ceive equal pay for equal work." EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 119. Ms. Grant asserted
that denying her the travel benefits requested constituted discrimination based on sex in
violation of this provision. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 9. Ms. Grant also relied on
Council Directive 76/207/EEC because it is a social policy directive that provides: "The
purpose of this Directive is to put into effect in the Member States the principle of equal
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, including promotion, and
to vocational training and as regards working conditions .. " Council Directive
76/207/EEC, art. 1, 1976 O.J. (L 39) at 40-42 [hereinafter Council Directive 76/207]. The
Directive provides further that "[a]pplication of the principle of equal treatment means
that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex .... " Id art. 3. To-
gether these provisions should have provided Ms. Grant the relief she requested.
59. Grant, 1993 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 9.
60. Id. at I 11. See EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 119. Council Directive
75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 provides: 'The principle of equal pay for men and women
outlined in Article 119 of the Treaty ... means, for the same work or for work to which
equal value is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of sex with re-
gard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration." Council Directive 75/117/EEC, art. 1,
O.J. (L 45) at 19-20 [hereinafter Council Directive 75/117].
61. Grant, Opinion of Advocate General, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 50.
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case from the perspective that SWT's policy constituted discrimination
based on gender, thereby violating previous laws established by the
ECJ in gender reassignment cases. 62 Specifically, the Advocate General
stated:
[w]hether the requirement for obtaining the concessions is satisfied ac-
cordingly depends on the gender both of the employee and of the co-
habitee. Travel concessions for a male cohabitee may only be obtained
if the employee is a woman. Travel concessions for a female cohabitee
may only be obtained if the employee is a man. The fact that cl. 8 of
the ticket regulations does not refer to a specific sex as the criterion for
discrimination, but lays down a more abstract criterion ('opposite sex)
can, in my view, make no difference, since the decisive point as laid
down in P v. S is whether discrimination is exclusively or essentially
based on sex.63
The Advocate General submitted this opinion to the ECJ. The ECJ,
however, made its own ruling and disregarded the opinion of the Advo-
cate General. 64 This action was unusual because in approximately sev-
enty-five percent of cases, the ECJ relies heavily on the Advocate Gen-
eral opinions, and in some instances the Advocate General opinion gives
insight as to how the ECJ will eventually rule on a case. 65
In Grant v. SWT, the ECJ first determined that Directive
76/207/EEC did not apply to Ms. Grant's case because travel conces-
sions are "pay," as such term is defined in Article 119 of the EC
Treaty.66  This distinction has significance because Directive
76/207/EEC, which prohibits employment discrimination based on sex,
does not cover pay benefits, and thus, is inapplicable when a complaint
involves pay benefits.67
62. Id. See Case C-13/94, P v. S & Cornwall County Council, 1996 All E.R. (E.C.)
397, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996) [hereinafter P v. S]. In P v. S, the ECJ held that employers
could not dismiss people who have gender reassignments because such discrimination is
based on the sex of the person, and thus directly prohibited by the relevant provisions of
the EEC Treaty. Grant, Opinion of Advocate General, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 11 24-25.
63. Grant, Opinion of Advocate General, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at I 24-25.
64. See Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 50.
65. Terence Shaw, Lesbian Couple Lose Fight Over Rail Perks: Setback for Gay Rights
Campaigners in Sex Discrimination Case, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Feb. 18, 1998, at
13. Some people did rely on the Advocate General's opinion as insight into how the ECJ
would rule. See, e.g., Spackman, supra note 56, at 115-19.
66. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 14.
67. Grant, Opinion of Advocate General, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 11. See Case C-
342/93, Gillespie & Others v. Northern Health & Soc. Serv. Bd. & Others, 1996 All E.R.
(E.C.) 284, 2 C.M.L.R. 969, at 1 37 (1996) [hereinafter Gillespie]. "[T]he underlying ra-
tionale of [Directive 76/207/EEC] is clearly set out in the preamble thereto ... It forms
part of the social action programme ... Its aim is to extend the principle of equal treat-
ment for men and women to access to employment and to working conditions other than
pay." Gillespie, 1996 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 37.
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Next, the ECJ had three questions to answer: 1) whether SWT's
travel concession policy constituted discrimination based on sex; 2)
whether Community Law requires employers to regard same-sex rela-
tionships the same as heterosexual marriage or other heterosexual rela-
tionships; and 3) whether discrimination based on sexual orientation is
discrimination based on sex.68
In answering the first question, the ECJ determined that the
regulations were not discriminatory based on sex because SWT would
have treated a male co-worker living with a person of the same-sex ex-
actly the same as it treated Ms. Grant.69 As to the second question, the
ECJ acknowledged that although the European Parliament has de-
clared that it deplores all discrimination based on sexual orientation,
the European Commission, as well as the Parliament, have not yet
adopted rules prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. 70
When addressing the third question, Ms. Grant attempted to in-
voke the provisions of various international treaties such as the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),71 and the
findings of the Human Rights Commission to support her argument
that discrimination based on sex includes sexual orientation.72 In re-
sponse, the Court held that although international instruments com-
prise an integral part of Community Law, they cannot be used to extend
the scope of the EC Treaty (i.e. to prohibit discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation).73 In addition, the Court stated that the findings of the
Human Rights Commission do not have the binding force of law because
the Human Rights Commission is not a judicial institution. 74 Conse-
quently, the Human Rights Commission's interpretation of the ICCPR
that "sex" in Article 2 paragraphs 1 and 26 includes sexual orientation,
does not require the ECJ to extend the EC Treaty provisions to include
such an interpretation. 75
The ECJ relied on the fact that despite modern attitudes toward
homosexual relationships, the European Human Rights Convention
does not recognize stable homosexual relationships as within scope of a
key fundamental right: i.e. the right to respect for family life. 76 The
68. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 11-12.
69. Id. at 11 27-28. The ECJ made it clear that the discrimination involved in Grant
was based on sexual orientation, not sex, and therefore, no provision under existing
Community law could protect Ms. Grant.
70. Id. at 11 31-32.
71. Id. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 .... I.L.M... [hereinafter ICCPRI.
72. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 43.
73. Id. at 145.
74. Id. at 1 46.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1 33. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, [hereinafter Human
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ECJ based its findings on the fact that the European Court of Human
Rights has held that Article 12 of the Human Rights Convention only
applies to traditional heterosexual marriages.77 Article 12 provides:
"Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of
this right."7 8 Furthermore, the ECJ concluded that although Article 14
of the Human Rights Convention prohibits discrimination based on sex,
in the interests of protecting family interests, and particularly procrea-
tion, more favorable treatment is afforded to heterosexual couples than
homosexual couples.7 9 From this the Court determined that Commu-
nity Law does not require equivalent treatment for homosexual and
heterosexual relationships, and thus employers do not have to treat
same-sex relationships the same as heterosexual relationships.8 0 Hav-
ing made that determination, the Court deferred to the legislatures of
the various EU Member States, as well as the European Parliament, to
pass legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation,
thereby retaining the status quo.8 '
Ironically, and in contravention with the analysis of the ECJ, in
1990, the European Parliament recognized that the Community (at
least up to that point) did not have the power to intervene in cases of
discriminatory practices by Member States against sexual minorities.8 2
However, despite this, the Parliament took solace in the fact that:
[t]he fundamental rights of sexual minorities are protected by other in-
ternational instruments. Since all the Member States are members of
the Council of Europe and signatories to the European Convention on
Human Rights, the Commission and the Court of Human Rights are
best able to guarantee the protection of sexual minorities against dis-
crimination.8 3
The ECJ decision in the Grant v. SWT case greatly undermined
this position taken by the European Parliament.
Rights Convention].
77. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 76, art. 12.
78. Id.
79. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 33. Article 14 of the Human Rights Convention
provides: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, relig-
ion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minor-
ity, property, birth or other status." Human Rights Convention, supra note 76, art. 14.
80. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 35.
81. Id. at 36.
82. Clapham & Weiler, supra note 4, at 28. Now, in light of the Amsterdam Treaty,
the European Council has a mechanism through which to intervene and prohibit Member
States from discriminating based on sexual orientation. See Amsterdam Treaty, supra
note 14, at pt. 1, art 13.
83. Clapham & Weiler, supra note 4, at 28 n.42 (emphasis added).
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In addition to the above arguments, Ms. Grant attempted to com-
pare her case to cases involving discrimination based on gender reas-
signment.8 4 The ECJ, in previous decisions, prohibited discrimination
based on gender reassignment.85 In his opinion, the Advocate General
attempted to point this out in reference to Ms. Grant's situation.86 The
Advocate General argued that the travel benefits afforded to heterosex-
ual married couples and cohabitees were based on gender insofar as the
employee must be the opposite sex of the cohabitee.8 7 Thus, "[w]hether
the requirement for obtaining the concessions is satisfied ... depends
on the gender both of the employee and of the cohabitee. Travel conces-
sions for a male cohabitee may only be obtained if the employee is a
woman,"88 and vice versa. Therefore, according to the Advocate Gen-
eral, SWT's "opposite sex" requirement is based on sex, and the Court
should not tolerate such a policy.
The ECJ, however, distinguished Ms. Grant's case from others in-
volving gender reassignment stating that discrimination based on gen-
der reassignment is based "essentially, if not exclusively, on the sex of
the person concerned;" 89 whereas, in the opinion of the Court, SWT
based its discriminatory policies on sexual orientation, not the sex of
the individual. 90 This distinction is analogous to that made by some
American courts when they hold that although same-sex marriage is
prohibited, so long as people have gone through the process of changing
their sex, they can marry another who is technically their same sex.91
In addition to its other arguments, the Court pointed out that even
Member States that recognize same-sex partnerships do not afford
84. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 37.
85. See P v. S, 1996 All E.R. (E.C.) at Decision. Gender reassignment means indi-
viduals who have had sex change operations. The discrimination in P v. S did not involve
pay, and thus the ECJ invoked the provisions of Council Directive 76/207/EEC to protect
transsexual individuals.
86. Grant, Opinion of Advocate General, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.), at 11 24-25.
87. Id. at 24.
88. Id.
89. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 42.
90. Id.
91. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 1976). Some American
courts allow couples who are technically of the same-sex, to marry if one of them has a sex
change operation (i.e. a man marries another man who has become a woman). Id. How-
ever, the sex change has to take place before the marriage occurs. Id. According to some
courts, this does not constitute same-sex marriage. Id. Some people base their opinions
regarding sexual orientation on their perceptions of homosexuality. Some believe that
homosexuality is a changeable characteristic that people choose, whereas characteristics
such as sex, race, and disability are characteristics people have no control over. Relying
on this argument, people can justify making a distinction between protecting classes
based on race, sex and disability, and refusing to protect sexual minorities. However, this
argument begs the question, if sexual orientation is a choice, and thus excepted from pro-
tection, why do we protect people from religious persecution? Furthermore, modern tech-
nology has proven that sex is no longer an unchangeable characteristic.
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those partnerships all the same rights enjoyed by heterosexual couples,
and, thus, allow at least some level of discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 92 Impliedly, the Court recognized that in the nations that
recognize homosexual partnerships, such partnerships are recognized in
the form of "Registered Partnerships," not marriages. In addition, the
court pointed out that in these nations, homosexual couples do not have
all the rights heterosexual couples have, most significantly, homosexual
citizens are denied the rights to a church marriage, to adopt a child,
and to have artificial insemination. Thus, some level of discrimination
is tolerated even by nations recognizing homosexual relationships as
partnerships. 93
The Grant v. SWT decision by the ECJ surprised many, especially
in light of the Advocate General's opinion. The Court may have based
its decision on social mores that frown upon same-sex partnerships, but
more likely, the Court tried to avoid "trespassing on the role of Euro-
pean legislators."94 Unfortunately, in its effort to allow Member State
legislatures to pass laws regarding discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation, the ECJ failed to ensure uniformity of interpretation of Com-
munity Law regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Consequently, the laws regarding discrimination remain varied. The
impact is most likely temporary in light of the Amsterdam Treaty, but
temporary may consist of a long period of time. The next section ad-
dresses the affect the Amsterdam Treaty may have on prohibiting of
discrimination based on sexual orientation and the impact on the free
movement of persons.
IV. THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM & ITS AFFECT ON DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
A. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM
As expressed in the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome,95 one of the
main purposes of the EU - from the perspective of the Member States -
is "the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of
their peoples."96 Encompassed within this purpose is the goal of free
92. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 11 31-32. See supra notes 16-46 and accompany-
ing text.
93. Goransson, supra note 20, at 170-75.
94. Shaw, supra note 65. See Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 11 36 and 48.
95. The EEC Treaty (Treaty of Rome) was signed March 25, 1957, and entered into
force January 1, 1958. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 8, at 209. In February 1986, the
EC Member States signed the Single European Act, which entered into force July 1, 1987.
Id. The EC Member States signed the EU Treaty February 2, 1992, and it entered into
force November 1, 1993. Id. The EU Treaty became known as the Maastricht Treaty, af-
ter the place where it was signed. Id. Thereafter, the entire European Communities be-
came the European Union (EU). Id.
96. Francis Snyder, et al., Subsidiarity: An Aspect of European Community Law and
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movement of people between Member States. The recent Grant v. SWT
decision had an impact on the free movement of people because it allows
employers to continue to discriminate based on sexual orientation, if the
laws of a Member State allow such conduct. This leads to the unequal
treatment of gay men and lesbians between Member States because, as
previously discussed, the EU Member States have differing social atti-
tudes and laws regarding homosexuality. Out of a population of ap-
proximately 365 million people,9 7 the lesbian, gay and bisexual popula-
tion in the EU includes at least eighty million citizens.98 Thus, the
unequal treatment of gay men and lesbians could potentially have an
important economic impact for the entire EU, and thus could limit the
EU's ultimate goals of full economic integration, 99 harmonization of so-
cial systems, 10 0 and close cooperation in employment, labor law, and
working conditions.' 01
As early as 1981, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe attempted to prevent discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion. ° 2 The Assembly's Committee on Social and Health Questions
proposed that the Assembly adopt a provision guaranteeing "the right
to sexual determination."'' 03 This could be done by adding "sexual pref-
erence" to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. 0 4 The Assembly approved other propos-
als including "abolishing police record-keeping of homosexual activity;
ensuring equal treatment for homosexuals in employment; ending all
medical research designed to alter sexual orientation; guaranteeing
homosexual parents the right to custody of their children; and reducing
the risk of rape and violence against homosexuals in prisons."105 How-
ever, the Assembly refused to take the ultimate step of modifying the
text of the Convention because it wanted to allow the case law in the
area to further develop before it took such a significant step.106 This re-
its Relevance to Lesbians and Gay Men, in HOMOSEXUALITY, supra note 1, at 230.
97. What is the European Community? (visited June 6, 1999) <http:
//europa.eu.intl/cj/en/pres/qce.htm>.
98. PETER TATCHELL, EUROPE IN THE PINK: LESBIAN & GAY EQUALITY IN THE NEW
EUROPE 15 (1992).
99. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 2.
100. Id. art. 117. See Kees Waaldijk, The Legal Situation in the Member States, in
HOMOSEXUALITY, supra note 1, at 75.
101. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 118. See Tatchell, supra note 98, at 55 (discuss-
ing Article 118).
102. Helfer, supra note 8, at 183. The Assembly is composed of representatives ap-
pointed by the Parliaments of each nation that has ratified the European Convention.
The Parliament makes recommendations related to human rights. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 183-84.
106. Id. at 184.
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fusal undermined the Assembly's recommendations. 10 7
In 1984 the European Parliament made a statement deploring "all
forms of discrimination based on an individual's sexual tendencies," and
asked Member States to take action to stop legal and social anti-
homosexual discrimination.108 The Parliament proposed a resolution
requesting that EC 109 Member States take action similar to the propos-
als of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 110 How-
ever, the European Commission took no further action because it
claimed that the EC Treaty provided no guidance regarding gay and
lesbian rights, and thus it had no competence to take action prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation."'
In 1989 the European Parliament reiterated its support for equal
treatment of homosexuals by proposing that the European Social Char-
ter ensure the right of all workers to equal protection regardless of sex-
ual preference. 112 However, the Parliament did not take any further ac-
tion." 3  In 1994, the European Parliament again attempted to
encourage Member States to protect sexual minorities. 1' 4 As mentioned
above, the Parliament passed a resolution asking Member States to
pass legislation that provides homosexuals and lesbians access to "mar-
riage or an equivalent legal framework and to adoption and fostering of
children." 115 Thus far, most Member States have not passed such leg-
islation.
The most recent attempt to eliminate discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation is contained in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. Before ad-
dressing specific articles of the Amsterdam Treaty, a background that
led to the drafting of the Amsterdam Treaty is necessary. In 1992 the
EC Member States decided to expand European law beyond the provi-
sions of the Treaty of Rome." 6 In order to do this, the EC Member
States signed the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). 1' 7 The TEU ex-
panded EU law through: 1) increasing monetary union provisions; 2)
granting citizenship in the EU to all citizens of the Member States; 3)
heightened social provisions; and 4) including different areas of empha-
107. Id.
108. Waaldijk, supra note 100, at 75. See Heifer, supra note 8, at 184 (referring to
proposed resolution that advocated Member State action).
109. At the time the EU was called the European Community (EC).
110. Helfer, supra note 8, at 184-85.
111. Id. at 185.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Goransson, supra note 20, at 176.
115. Id.
116. Daniel T. Murphy, The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy: It
Is Not Far From Maastricht to Amsterdam, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 871, 872 (1998).
117. Id.
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sis between Member States and the EC Treaty institutions. ' 18 The TEU
established a set of relationships between the Treaty, EU institutions,
and the Member States. 1 9 These relationships rest on "three pil-
lars."'120 The first pillar consists of the EC Treaty and its related acts. 12'
The other two pillars are the Common Security and Foreign Policy, and
Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs.' 22
At the direction of the TEU, the Member States held an Intergov-
ernmental Conference. 123  This Conference was held over sixteen
months, and culminated in June 1997 with agreement on the text of a
draft treaty - the Amsterdam Treaty.' 24 In October 1997, the EU
Member States signed the final version of the Amsterdam Treaty. 125
The Amsterdam Treaty "shall enter into force on the first day of the
second month following that in which the last Member State deposits
the instrument of ratification with the Italian government."126 France
was the last EU Member State to ratify the Amsterdam Treaty. It did
so in March 1999.127
With respect to the issues addressed in this paper, the most signifi-
cant provision of the Amsterdam Treaty provides:
[w]ithout prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the
limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after con-
sulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to com-
bat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or be-
lief, disability, age or sexual orientation.128
This provision has significance because it constitutes the first offi-
cial action taken by the EU that may definitively prohibit discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation on a Community-wide basis. Unlike
the Amsterdam Treaty, all previous efforts have been contingent upon
the legislatures of the various Member States passing laws prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, as addressed be-
low, there is one caveat -- this provision is based on the unanimous ac-
tion of the EU Council.
Some critics lobbied heavily against passing the Amsterdam
118. Id.
119. Id. at 874.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Murphy, supra note 116, at 874.
123. Id. at 875.
124. Id. at 872.
125. Id.
126. Youri Devuyst, Introductory Note, in Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14.
127. France Ratifies EU Amsterdam Treaty Amid Criticism, AGENCE-FR. PRESSE, Mar.
3, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2556911.
128. Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt. 1, art. 13 (emphasis added).
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Treaty. 129 A main concern for one critic, Justice Rory O'Hanlon, was
the loss of sovereignty for small nations such as Ireland. This con-
cerned Justice O'Hanlon because nations are not compensated for sov-
ereignty they agree to sacrifice. 130 Justice O'Hanlon wrote that the Am-
sterdam Treaty is a step toward giving up all sovereignty, and is on a
path toward a "vast, unwieldy conglomerate of states with different
languages, traditions and cultures."131 Part 1, Article 13 of the Amster-
dam Treaty, which provides the mechanism to stop discrimination
based on sexual orientation, bothered Justice O'Hanlon the most.1 32 In
Justice O'Hanlon's opinion, this provision defeats "the will of the Irish
people."
13 3
This argument fails to acknowledge the fact that measures cannot
be passed without the support of the entire Membership of the EU
Council, including Ireland. Thus, if prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation truly undermines the will of the Irish people, theo-
retically, such a provision will not pass through the EU Council because
Ireland will have the ability to veto any provision it disagrees with.
In order to implement prohibitions on discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation, the EU Council must act unanimously, and the Euro-
pean Parliament must be consulted.13 4 This means that one Member
State can act unilaterally to prevent the Council from passing provi-
sions prohibiting discrimination. This raises problems because most
Member States, particularly the United Kingdom, do not allow homo-
sexuals to have the same rights and privileges as heterosexuals. 135
129. See Patricia McKenna, Vote No So We Can Renegotiate a More Democratic
Europe: Voters Should Ask Why They Are Deliberately Being Kept in the Dark, by a Cam-
paign of Insults and Abuse, About the Implications for Ireland of the Amsterdam Treaty,
IRISH TIMES, May 12, 1998, at 16; Justice Rory O'Hanlon, We Must Reject Further Inter-
national Interference in our Domestic Affairs: The Amsterdam Treaty is a Bridge Too Far;
We Should Not be Bludgeoned Into Accepting Political Union, IRISH TIMES, May 20, 1998,
at 16.
130. O'Hanlon, supra note 129
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Ms. McKenna argued that the EU Member States should not have passed the
Amsterdam Treaty because the Treaty takes away too much decision-making power in
major political areas from national governments, and gives it to Brussels. McKenna, su-
pra note 129.
134. Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt. 1, art. 13.
135. Historically, England has been one of the most outwardly hostile nations toward
homosexual relationships. Jorge Martin, Note, English Polygamy Law and the Danish
Registered Partnership Act: A Case for the Consistent Treatment of Foreign Polygamous
Marriages and Danish Same-sex Marriages in England, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 419, 428-
30 (1994). Some examples of English hostility are: 1) The Sexual Offences Act of 1967 de-
fines privacy so narrowly that when applied to same-sex relationships, if a same-sex cou-
ple has sex in a bedroom when someone is in another room of the house, they are in viola-
tion of the act. Therefore, same-sex couples having sex in a hotel are in violation of the
act. Id. at 428. 2) Section 28 of the Local Government Act of 1988 "prohibits local authori-
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Thus, although the Amsterdam Treaty allows for action prohibiting dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation, the unanimity requirement
allows those nations wary of giving up too much of their sovereignty to
the EU Community to veto legislation prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation. 136 The unanimity requirement thus makes it
more difficult to get measures passed. Consequently, the Amsterdam
Treaty is only a framework for passing laws in the future; it does not
constitute a current prohibition on discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation.' 37
Further complicating matters was the resignation of the entire
membersip of the EU Commission following accusations of wrongdo-
ing. 138 This has an especially detrimental affect on the Amsterdam
Treaty because before EU Member States are obligated to pass laws
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, the EU Com-
mission must propose such legislation. 139 Although a new commission
has been selected, the political turmoil and economic crises in the EU
make the proposal of legislation prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation a hope for the distant future.' 40
Although the Amsterdam Treaty is a step in the right direction,
"any progress under [the provisions prohibiting discrimination based on
ties from intentionally promoting homosexuality as a pretended family relationship." Id.
at 428-29 (internal citation omitted). 3) Section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act of
1973 makes a marriage void if it is not "respectively male and female." Id. at 429 (citation
omitted). Ironically, despite English hostility toward rights for homosexuals, Cherie
Blair, wife of Prime Minister Tony Blair, served as counsel for Lisa Grant in her case be-
fore the ECJ. Ben Fenton, Cherie Booth, QC, Puts Case Against the Government: Blair's
Wife Takes Lesbian Cause to Europe, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), July 10, 1997, at 8.
136. See generally Padraig Flynn, Amsterdam Will Create a Union Responsive to Peo-
ple's Needs: Opponents of the Amsterdam Treaty Have Made Wild and Misleading Claims
While the Reality is That the Treaty Gives the Irish Public all the Guarantees its (sic) Re-
quires on the Issue of Defence, IRISH TIMES, May, 18, 1998, at 14 (arguing for the passage
of the Amsterdam Treaty despite the fact that it requires further surrender of sovereignty
to the EU Community because the Amsterdam Treaty will "create a union responsive to
the people's needs").
137. Angela Broughton, et al., International Employment, 32 INT'L LAW. 303, 305
(1998). Many recognize the reality that it is unlikely that the EU Commission will have
the ability to pass laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, at least
not for a while, because of the unanimity requirement. See Charles Bremner, Gay Work-
ers Have No Right To Equal Benefits, TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 18, 1998, at 14.
138. Phillip J. Longman, The High Price of Staying Together: A Scandal Highlights
Problems in Euro-land, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 29, 1999, at 46. Finally, after six
months, the EU Parliament approved the appointment of a new president of the EU
Commission - Romano Prodi, former Italian prime minister. Prodi has selected his com-
mission, but this setback has delayed a number of crucial decisions, many which are more
pressing than banning discrimination based on sexual orientation. And So to Business,
GULF NEWS, Sept. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21060955.
139. See Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt. 1, art. 13.
140. See generally Longman, supra note 138 (discussing the political and economic
turmoil of the EU since the implementation of the euro - the European single currency).
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sexual orientation] will depend on the work of committed and deter-
mined activists.141 Furthermore, because the Amsterdam Treaty only
requires the Council of Ministers to take appropriate action to combat
discrimination based on sexual orientation, this may only consist of di-
rectives, thus requiring each EU Member government to pass its own
legislation complying with the directives. 142 This puts prohibitions on
discrimination based on sexual orientation back to the position they
were in before the Amsterdam Treaty. "This could add years to the
time it would take a non-discrimination ban to go into effect."'143
B. THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
One fundamental right affected by discrimination based on sexual
orientation is the free movement of persons. This infringment makes
prohibitions on such discrimination even more important. The Amster-
dam Treaty, with its emphasis on equal treatment and non-
discrimination, is a small step toward furthering the European integra-
tion process, particularly the free movement of persons, though there is
still much work to be done.
The free movement of persons is a fundamental right under the EU
Treaty, but only to the extent that such a right helps further the Com-
munity objective of a fully integrated free market economy. 144 In the
EU context, a fundamental right is not defined the same as a funda-
mental right under the United States Constitution. Fundamental
rights in the EU are "capitalist principles that promote free trade and
movement across national borders." 145 The EU Treaty guarantees the
free movement of persons to workers under Article 48 of the EU Treaty,
and to the self-employed who have the right of establishment under Ar-
ticle 52.146 However, as mentioned above, Member States may impose
limitations on the right of EU citizens to enter and take up work in
their states.147 Member States may base these limitations on public
policy, public security and/or public health. In addition, states are free
"to determine the requirements of public policy in light of their national
needs."148 However, these limitations must be justified, and the ECJ
may review such to ensure that the justification complies with the
terms and purposes of the EU. 149
141. Flynn, supra note 136.
142. Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt. 1, art. 13; Edwin Unsworth, E.U. Rejects
Same-Sex Benefits, BUS. INS., Mar. 2, 1998, at 31.
143. Unsworth, supra note 142, at 31.
144. Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The Court of
Justice, Social Policy, and Individual Rights Under the European Community's Legal Or-
der, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 341 (1996).
145. Id. at 308.
146. Id. at 346-47.
147. Clapham & Weiler, supra note 4, at 39.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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The ECJ analyzed the definition of "worker" and the scope of the
right to free movement in Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie.1 50 In
that case, the Court discussed the objectives of the EU Treaty and
stated that "according to Articles 2 and 3, [one of the objectives of the
EU Treaty is] the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to
freedom of movement for persons, with the purpose inter alia of pro-
moting throughout the Community a harmonious development of eco-
nomic activities and a raising of the standard of living." 51 Based on this
objective, the Court held that Mrs. Levin, as a part-time worker, had
the right to freely move and work in any EU Member State "because the
denial of such a right to her and to other part-time workers would have
undermined the successful attainment of the Community's economic
objectives."1 52 Thus, for the right of free movement to apply to EU citi-
zens, it must assist in the creation of an integrated common market. 5 3
Therefore, the determination as to whether an individual is entitled to
the right of free movement stems from "whether he or she is an active
participant in the economy."' 54
The main goal of the EU is economic integration, thus social policy
issues are secondary and only addressed to the extent that they impact
economic integration. 155  Unfortunately, because of this secondary
status, the social policies related to same-sex couples and free move-
ment have not moved toward protecting homosexuals' "fundamental
right" to free movement, although discrimination in employment in any
form does impact economic integration.
Most Member States probably prefer to ignore the long-term eco-
nomic impact discrimination has, rather than address the social policies
impacted by discrimination based on sexual orientation. Most signifi-
cantly, the criteria set forth in Levin (i.e. whether a citizen is an active
participant in the economy determines their entitlement to a right of
free movement), have not applied to homosexual employees within the
EU. At present, most states do not prohibit employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation. 56 This causes a problem because dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation is a disincentive for homosex-
ual citizens of non-discriminatory states Member States to move to and
find employment in discriminatory Member States. 157
Other factors such as higher taxes and higher crime rates may also
150. Ball, supra note 144, at 349.
151. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
152. Id. at 350.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 308-09.
156. Only France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland prohibit such discrimina-
tion. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
157. Ball, supra note 144, at 382.
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLYV
affect free movement, however, discrimination in employment directly
affects a fundamental objective of the Community - freedom of move-
ment to allow citizens of Member States to compete in the EU's labor
market.'58 Thus, Member States should work harder to actively pro-
hibit such discrimination.
As the laws of the Member States currently stand, homosexual em-
ployees receive different treatment depending upon the Member State
they live in. This inequality of treatment impedes free movement be-
cause "employees in countries where they are guaranteed legal protec-
tion against discrimination may be loathe to relocate in other [EU]
[Mlember [SItates where no such protection exists because they would
thereby be vulnerable to discrimination."15 9 For example, homosexual
citizens in Denmark, France, Ireland and the Netherlands have their
rights of free movement infringed because no other countries offer pro-
tection against employment discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion.160 In addition, homosexual employees of other Member States may
move to France, Ireland or the Netherlands because they currently are
the only Member States offering such protection, thereby distorting free
competition in labor markets, and putting employers in EU countries
without protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation
at a disadvantage. 16 1 These employers may be disadvantaged in a
number of ways, but most significantly they may be unable to attract
some "high calibre" employees merely because the employees are homo-
sexual. 162
158. Id. at 382-83.
159. TATCHELL, supra note 98, at 56.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Following are a few examples of the ways in which homosexuals may be dis-
criminated against in nations that are hostile toward homosexual relationships: 1) A
French lesbian may accept seasonal work in Germany, thereby availing herself of the
privilege of free movement. While in Germany, she could be confronted with harassment
from her employer if he or she discovers her sexuality. However, unlike in France, she
will have no legal recourse in Germany to stop the harassment or ensure that she will re-
ceive compensation for her services; 2) An American company may locate its headquarters
in the United Kingdom. Citizens from all the various EU countries staff the headquar-
ters. While in the UK, homosexual staff members will face the following discrimination
and persecution: a) they will have no legal protection against sexual discrimination in the
workplace, including unfair dismissal or harassment; b) they will have no legal protection
against sexual discrimination in the provision of public and private services, such as
housing; c) the male staff members could be prosecuted if they have sex with other men,
unless both are at least 21, and the sexual acts occur in a private dwelling with doors
locked, windows shut, and no other person is in any part of the house; and d) the gay male
staff members, and in some instances lesbian staff members, may be prosecuted for con-
sensual non-genital contact (i.e. kissing, caressing, exchanging telephone numbers in a
public place, etc.). Id. at 56-57. These types of issues will have the greatest impact on
free movement until the European Council passes some type of community-wide legisla-
tion prohibiting this type of treatment. However, as mentioned above, passing such laws
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Another issue raised by Grant v. SWT involves the inability of ho-
mosexual citizens to move from one Member State to another as guar-
anteed by Article 8 of the EU Treaty. Current laws in most Member
States infringe upon this right because some Member States allow ho-
mosexual citizens to receive employment benefits for their same-sex
partners, whereas other Member States deny such benefits. Further-
more, some Member States allow Registered Partnerships that provide
invaluable benefits equivalent to those offered to married couples. De-
spite potential better employment opportunities in other Member
States, homosexual citizens may not want to leave non-discriminating
Member States because they would then have to forfeit these benefits.
Some may argue that if emigration occurs within the EU, the losses
will be internalized, thereby minimizing the overall impact to the EU. 163
Although the overall costs to the EU as a whole will not be excessive,
certain regions will likely suffer unnecessary "brain drain" and eco-
nomic disparity. 16 4 This would lead to an unequal allocation of the EU
work force. 16 5 Thus, although the right of free movement is not overtly
denied to same-sex couples or homosexual citizens, discrimination in-
ringes on such a right.
The most recent attempt made by the EU institutions through the
Amsterdam Treaty can potentially protect the lesbian and gay commu-
nity against discrimination in areas already within the competence of
the Community (i.e. employment conditions and the free movement of
labor).166 Such an approach couches the protection in terms of economic
fairness and equality, rather than morality, thereby making it easier for
EU Member States less open to equal treatment for homosexuals, to
implement measures prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation.16 7 These Member States can justify their actions based on eco-
nomic rather than social considerations because denying the right of
free movement, whether direct or indirect, to one portion of the citi-
zenry, impairs economic expansion and stability.'6 8
V. CONCLUSION
Although the EU has proceeded in the right direction toward pro-
may not occur for a long time. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
163. Russell Child, The Economic Situation in the Member States, in HOMOSEXUALITY,
supra note 1, at 171.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Ball, supra note 144, at 385.
167. See id.
168. See generally Waaldijk, supra note 100, at 75 (referring to the ongoing existence
of homosexual discrimination).
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hibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Grant v. SWT
decision still prevails as the current law in the EU. This decision unfor-
tunately represents a setback in the homosexual rights movement that
has made various strides in the last thirty years. Aware of the im-
pending passage of the Amsterdam Treaty, the ECJ took a conservative
approach to its decision in Grant v. SWT. This allowed the ECJ to
maintain the "status quo," and left the definitive decision-making to the
legislative branch of the EU.
Grant v. SWT presented the ECJ with the opportunity to defini-
tively decide this issue, but it chose not to capitalize on that opportu-
nity, and has now left the decision-making power to the members of the
European Council and the European Parliament. This causes problems
because the ability of the European Council to pass community-wide
legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation is
predicated on the unanimous vote of the European Council after consul-
tation with the European Parliament, and a proposal from the Euro-
pean Commission. 169 Due to the recent political and economic instabil-
ity in the EU, passage of the necessary legislation will be difficult. 170
Thus, rather than ensuring that the Member States apply the law
of the EU uniformly, the ECJ ensured that it will take a long time be-
fore uniformity exists with respect to discrimination against sexual mi-
norities. Despite failed attempts to do so in the past, the legislative and
executive institutions within the EU must continue to promote the pro-
hibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation in order for the
Community to achieve the full economic and social integration for
which it strives. Until then, it is clear that "[a]ll animals are equal, but
some animals are more equal than others."'171
169. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 48. See Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt.
1, art. 13.
170. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
171. Orwell, supra note 2, at 112.
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